Commit 952ee63b authored by David Kalnischkies's avatar David Kalnischkies

forbid insecure repositories by default expect in apt-get

With this commit all APT-based clients default to refusing to work with
unsigned or otherwise insufficently secured repositories. In terms of
apt and apt-get this changes nothing, but it effects all tools using
libapt like aptitude, synaptic or packagekit.

The exception remains apt-get for stretch for now as this might break
too many scripts/usecases too quickly.

The documentation is updated and extended to reflect how to opt out or
in on this behaviour change.

Closes: 808367
parent b1bdfe68
......@@ -86,10 +86,7 @@ bool pkgInitConfig(Configuration &Cnf)
Cnf.Set("Dir::Ignore-Files-Silently::", "\\.distUpgrade$");
// Repository security
// FIXME: this is set to "true" for backward compatibility, once
// jessie is out we want to change this to "false" to
// improve security
Cnf.CndSet("Acquire::AllowInsecureRepositories", true);
Cnf.CndSet("Acquire::AllowInsecureRepositories", false);
Cnf.CndSet("Acquire::AllowDowngradeToInsecureRepositories", false);
// Default cdrom mount point
......
......@@ -372,7 +372,6 @@ std::vector<CommandLine::Args> getCommandArgs(APT_CMD const Program, char const
return Args;
}
/*}}}*/
#undef CmdMatches
#undef addArg
static void ShowHelpListCommands(std::vector<aptDispatchWithHelp> const &Cmds)/*{{{*/
{
......@@ -445,15 +444,22 @@ static void BinarySpecificConfiguration(char const * const Binary) /*{{{*/
_config->CndSet("Binary::apt::APT::Get::Upgrade-Allow-New", true);
_config->CndSet("Binary::apt::APT::Cmd::Show-Update-Stats", true);
_config->CndSet("Binary::apt::DPkg::Progress-Fancy", true);
_config->CndSet("Binary::apt::Acquire::AllowInsecureRepositories", false);
_config->CndSet("Binary::apt::APT::Keep-Downloaded-Packages", false);
}
if (binary == "apt-config")
_config->CndSet("Binary::apt-get::Acquire::AllowInsecureRepositories", true);
_config->Set("Binary", binary);
std::string const conf = "Binary::" + binary;
_config->MoveSubTree(conf.c_str(), NULL);
}
/*}}}*/
static void BinaryCommandSpecificConfiguration(char const * const Binary, char const * const Cmd)/*{{{*/
{
std::string const binary = flNotDir(Binary);
if (binary == "apt-get" && CmdMatches("update"))
_config->CndSet("Binary::apt-get::Acquire::AllowInsecureRepositories", true);
}
#undef CmdMatches
/*}}}*/
std::vector<CommandLine::Dispatch> ParseCommandLine(CommandLine &CmdL, APT_CMD const Binary,/*{{{*/
Configuration * const * const Cnf, pkgSystem ** const Sys, int const argc, const char *argv[],
bool (*ShowHelp)(CommandLine &), std::vector<aptDispatchWithHelp> (*GetCommands)(void))
......@@ -481,11 +487,14 @@ std::vector<CommandLine::Dispatch> ParseCommandLine(CommandLine &CmdL, APT_CMD c
// Args running out of scope invalidates the pointer stored in CmdL,
// but we don't use the pointer after this function, so we ignore
// this problem for now and figure something out if we have to.
std::vector<CommandLine::Args> Args;
char const * CmdCalled = nullptr;
if (Cmds.empty() == false && Cmds[0].Handler != nullptr)
Args = getCommandArgs(Binary, CommandLine::GetCommand(Cmds.data(), argc, argv));
else
Args = getCommandArgs(Binary, nullptr);
CmdCalled = CommandLine::GetCommand(Cmds.data(), argc, argv);
if (CmdCalled != nullptr)
BinaryCommandSpecificConfiguration(argv[0], CmdCalled);
std::string const conf = "Binary::" + _config->Find("Binary");
_config->MoveSubTree(conf.c_str(), nullptr);
auto Args = getCommandArgs(Binary, CmdCalled);
CmdL = CommandLine(Args.data(), _config);
if (CmdL.Parse(argc,argv) == false ||
......
......@@ -563,8 +563,9 @@
<varlistentry><term><option>--no-allow-insecure-repositories</option></term>
<listitem><para>Forbid the update command to acquire unverifiable
data from configured sources. Apt will fail at the update command
for repositories without valid cryptographically signatures.
data from configured sources. APT will fail at the update command
for repositories without valid cryptographically signatures. See
also &apt-secure; for details on the concept and the implications.
Configuration Item: <literal>Acquire::AllowInsecureRepositories</literal>.</para></listitem>
</varlistentry>
......
......@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@
&apt-email;
&apt-product;
<!-- The last update date -->
<date>2015-10-15T00:00:00Z</date>
<date>2016-03-18T00:00:00Z</date>
</refentryinfo>
<refmeta>
......@@ -48,22 +48,46 @@
Starting with version 0.6, <command>APT</command> contains code that does
signature checking of the Release file for all repositories. This ensures
that data like packages in the archive can't be modified by people who
have no access to the Release file signing key.
have no access to the Release file signing key. Starting with version 1.1
<command>APT</command> requires repositories to provide recent authentication
information for unimpeded usage of the repository.
</para>
<para>
If an archive has an unsigned Release file or no Release file at all
current APT versions will raise a warning in <command>update</command>
operations and front-ends like <command>apt-get</command> will require
explicit confirmation if an installation request includes a package from
such an unauthenticated archive.
current APT versions will refuse to download data from them by default
in <command>update</command> operations and even if forced to download
front-ends like &apt-get; will require explicit confirmation if an
installation request includes a package from such an unauthenticated
archive.
</para>
<para>
In the future APT will refuse to work with unauthenticated repositories by
default until support for them is removed entirely. Users have the option to
opt-in to this behavior already by setting the configuration option
<option>Acquire::AllowInsecureRepositories</option> to <literal>false</literal>.
As a temporary exception &apt-get; (not &apt;!) raises warnings only if it
encounters unauthenticated archives to give a slightly longer grace period
on this backward compatibility effecting change. This exception will be removed
in future releases and you can opt-out of this grace period by setting the
configuration option <option>Binary::apt-get::Acquire::AllowInsecureRepositories</option>
to <literal>false</literal> or <option>--no-allow-insecure-repositories</option>
on the command line.
</para>
<para>
You can force all APT clients to raise only warnings by setting the
configuration option <option>Acquire::AllowInsecureRepositories</option> to
<literal>true</literal>. Note that this option will eventually be removed.
Users also have the <option>Trusted</option> option available to disable
even the warnings, but be sure to understand the implications as detailed in
&sources-list;.
</para>
<para>
A repository which previously was authentication but would loose this state in
an <command>update</command> operation raises an error in all APT clients
irrespective of the option to allow or forbid usage of insecure repositories.
The error can be overcome by additionally setting
<option>Acquire::AllowDowngradeToInsecureRepositories</option>
to <literal>true</literal>.
</para>
<para>
......
......@@ -650,27 +650,24 @@ APT::Compressor::rev {
<varlistentry><term><option>AllowInsecureRepositories</option></term>
<listitem><para>
Allow the update operation to load data files from
a repository without a trusted signature. If enabled this
option no data files will be loaded and the update
operation fails with a error for this source. The default
is false for backward compatibility. This will be changed
in the future.
Allow update operations to load data files from
repositories without sufficient security information.
The default value is "<literal>false</literal>".
Concept and implications of this are detailed in &apt-secure;.
</para></listitem>
</varlistentry>
<varlistentry><term><option>AllowDowngradeToInsecureRepositories</option></term>
<listitem><para>
Allow that a repository that was previously gpg signed to become
unsigned durign a update operation. When there is no valid signature
of a previously trusted repository apt will refuse the update. This
option can be used to override this protection. You almost certainly
never want to enable this. The default is false.
Note that apt will still consider packages from this source
untrusted and warn about them if you try to install
them.
</para></listitem>
Allow that a repository that was previously gpg signed to become
unsigned during an update operation. When there is no valid signature
for a previously trusted repository apt will refuse the update. This
option can be used to override this protection. You almost certainly
never want to enable this. The default is <literal>false</literal>.
Note that apt will still consider packages from this source
untrusted and warns about them if you try to install them.
</para></listitem>
</varlistentry>
<varlistentry><term><option>Changelogs::URI</option> scope</term>
......
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