Commit 0d67241e authored by Daniel Kahn Gillmor's avatar Daniel Kahn Gillmor Committed by NIIBE Yutaka

Fix more spelling

* NEWS, acinclude.m4, agent/command-ssh.c, agent/command.c,
  agent/gpg-agent.c, agent/keyformat.txt, agent/protect-tool.c,
  common/asshelp.c, common/b64enc.c, common/recsel.c, doc/DETAILS,
  doc/HACKING, doc/Notes, doc/TRANSLATE, doc/dirmngr.texi,
  doc/faq.org, doc/gpg-agent.texi, doc/gpg.texi, doc/gpgsm.texi,
  doc/instguide.texi, g10/armor.c, g10/gpg.c, g10/keyedit.c,
  g10/mainproc.c, g10/pkclist.c, g10/tofu.c, g13/sh-cmd.c,
  g13/sh-dmcrypt.c, kbx/keybox-init.c, m4/pkg.m4, sm/call-dirmngr.c,
  sm/gpgsm.c, tests/Makefile.am, tests/gpgscm/Manual.txt,
  tests/gpgscm/scheme.c, tests/openpgp/gpgv-forged-keyring.scm,
  tests/openpgp/multisig.test, tests/openpgp/verify.scm,
  tests/pkits/README, tools/applygnupgdefaults,
  tools/gpg-connect-agent.c, tools/mime-maker.c, tools/mime-parser.c:
  minor spelling cleanup.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Kahn Gillmor's avatarDaniel Kahn Gillmor <dkg@fifthhorseman.net>
parent 215180d1
......@@ -2604,7 +2604,7 @@ Noteworthy changes in version 0.4.2 (1998-10-18)
prime product.
* --import now only looks for KEYBLOCK headers, so you can now simply
remove the "- " in front of such a header if someone accidently signed
remove the "- " in front of such a header if someone accidentally signed
such a message or the keyblock is part of a cleartext signed message.
* --with-colons now lists the key expiration time and not anymore
......
......@@ -113,7 +113,7 @@ AC_DEFUN([GNUPG_CHECK_ENDIAN],
;;
esac
fi
AC_MSG_CHECKING(endianess)
AC_MSG_CHECKING(endianness)
AC_CACHE_VAL(gnupg_cv_c_endian,
[ gnupg_cv_c_endian=unknown
# See if sys/param.h defines the BYTE_ORDER macro.
......
......@@ -1253,7 +1253,7 @@ ssh_receive_mpint_list (estream_t stream, int secret,
elems_n = strlen (elems);
elems_public = spec->elems_key_public;
/* Check that either noth, CERT and the WITH_CERT flag, are given or
/* Check that either both, CERT and the WITH_CERT flag, are given or
none of them. */
if (!(!!(spec->flags & SPEC_FLAG_WITH_CERT) ^ !cert))
{
......
......@@ -3176,7 +3176,7 @@ register_commands (assuan_context_t ctx)
/* Startup the server. If LISTEN_FD and FD is given as -1, this is a
simple piper server, otherwise it is a regular server. CTRL is the
control structure for this connection; it has only the basic
intialization. */
initialization. */
void
start_command_handler (ctrl_t ctrl, gnupg_fd_t listen_fd, gnupg_fd_t fd)
{
......
......@@ -2498,7 +2498,7 @@ handle_connections (gnupg_fd_t listen_fd,
strerror (errno));
else
{
/* We need to watch the directory for the file becuase there
/* We need to watch the directory for the file because there
* won't be an IN_DELETE_SELF for a socket file. */
char *slash = strrchr (socket_name, '/');
log_assert (slash && slash[1]);
......
......@@ -363,8 +363,8 @@ optional. The oder of the "key" lists and the order of the "value"
lists mut match, that is the first "key"-list is associated with the
first "value" list in the encrypted_octet_string.
The protection mode etc. is indentical to the protection mode as
decribed for the private key format.
The protection mode etc. is identical to the protection mode as
described for the private key format.
list of the secret key parameters. The protected-at expression is
optional; the isotimestamp is 15 bytes long (e.g. "19610711T172000").
......
......@@ -611,7 +611,7 @@ main (int argc, char **argv )
else if (argc > 1)
usage (1);
/* Allocate an CTRL object. An empty object should sufficent. */
/* Allocate an CTRL object. An empty object should sufficient. */
ctrl = xtrycalloc (1, sizeof *ctrl);
if (!ctrl)
{
......
......@@ -689,7 +689,7 @@ start_new_dirmngr (assuan_context_t *r_ctx,
0 is returned and R_VERSION receives a malloced string with the
version which must be freed by the caller. On error NULL is stored
at R_VERSION and an error code returned. Mode is in general 0 but
certian values may be used to modify the used version command:
certain values may be used to modify the used version command:
MODE == 0 = Use "GETINFO version"
MODE == 2 - Use "SCD GETINFO version"
......
......@@ -169,7 +169,7 @@ enc_start (struct b64state *state, FILE *fp, estream_t stream,
the armor lines, with TITLE being an empty string, we don't write
the header lines and furthermore even don't write any linefeeds.
If TITLE starts with "PGP " the OpenPGP CRC checksum will be
written as well. With TITLE beeing NULL, we merely don't write
written as well. With TITLE being NULL, we merely don't write
header but make sure that lines are not too long. Note, that we
don't write any output unless at least one byte get written using
b64enc_write. */
......
......@@ -611,7 +611,7 @@ recsel_select (recsel_expr_t selector,
else
{
/* This expression evaluated to false and thus the
* conjuction evaluates to false. We skip over the
* conjunction evaluates to false. We skip over the
* remaining expressions of this conjunction and continue
* with the next disjunction if any. */
do
......
......@@ -15,6 +15,8 @@ This is the DETAILS file for GnuPG which specifies some internals and
parts of the external API for GPG and GPGSM.
* Format of the colon listings
*
The format is a based on colon separated record, each recods starts
with a tag string and extends to the end of the line. Here is an
example:
......@@ -91,7 +93,7 @@ described here.
ultimately valid.
- w :: The key has a well known private part.
- s :: The key has special validity. This means that it might be
self-signed and expected to be used in the STEED sytem.
self-signed and expected to be used in the STEED system.
If the validity information is given for a UID or UAT record, it
describes the validity calculated based on this user ID. If given
......@@ -120,7 +122,7 @@ described here.
The creation date of the key is given in UTC. For UID and UAT
records, this is used for the self-signature date. Note that the
date is usally printed in seconds since epoch, however, we are
date is usually printed in seconds since epoch, however, we are
migrating to an ISO 8601 format (e.g. "19660205T091500"). This is
currently only relevant for X.509. A simple way to detect the new
format is to scan for the 'T'. Note that old versions of gpg
......@@ -136,7 +138,7 @@ described here.
Used for serial number in crt records. For UID and UAT records,
this is a hash of the user ID contents used to represent that
exact user ID. For trust signatures, this is the trust depth
seperated by the trust value by a space.
separated by the trust value by a space.
*** Field 9 - Ownertrust
......@@ -715,7 +717,7 @@ pkd:0:1024:B665B1435F4C2 .... FF26ABB:
Tofu information. The fingerprint is the fingerprint of the
primary key and the mbox is in general the addr-spec part of the
userid encoded in UTF-8 and percent escaped. The fingerprint is
indentical for all TOFU_USER lines up to a NEWSIG line.
identical for all TOFU_USER lines up to a NEWSIG line.
*** TOFU_STATS <validity> <sign-count> 0 [<policy> [<tm1> <tm2> <tm3> <tm4>]]
......@@ -930,7 +932,7 @@ pkd:0:1024:B665B1435F4C2 .... FF26ABB:
commencing with a letter or such a string prefixed with a
numerical error code and an underscore; e.g.: "151011327_EOF".
*** SUCCESS [<location>]
Postive confirmation that an operation succeeded. It is used
Positive confirmation that an operation succeeded. It is used
similar to ISO-C's EXIT_SUCCESS. <location> is optional but if
given should not contain spaces. Used only with a few commands.
......@@ -987,7 +989,7 @@ pkd:0:1024:B665B1435F4C2 .... FF26ABB:
<name> is a percent-plus escaped filename describing the
mountpoint for the current operation (e.g. used by "g13 --mount").
This may either be the specified mountpoint or one randomly
choosen by g13.
chosen by g13.
*** PINENTRY_LAUNCHED <pid>
This status line is emitted by gpg to notify a client that a
......
......@@ -326,7 +326,7 @@ Note that such a comment will be removed if the git commit option
and related constants
- g10/openfile.c :: Create/Open Files
- g10/keyserver.h :: Keyserver access dispatcher.
- g10/packet.h :: Defintion of OpenPGP structures.
- g10/packet.h :: Definition of OpenPGP structures.
- g10/passphrase.c :: Passphrase handling code
- g10/pubkey-enc.c :: Process a public key encoded packet.
......
......@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ There are two ways:
1. Let gpg-agent do this for you. Since version 1.9.9 you need to
add the option --allow-mark-trusted gpg-agent.conf or when
invoking gpg-agent. Everytime gpgsm notices an untrusted root
invoking gpg-agent. Every time gpgsm notices an untrusted root
certificate gpg-agent will pop up a dialog to ask whether this
certificate should be trusted. This is similar to whatmost
browsers do.
......@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ There are two ways:
the fingerprints of the trusted root certificates. There are
comments on the top explaining the simple format. The current
CVS version allows for colons in the fingerprint, so you can
easily cut and paste it from whereever you know that this is the
easily cut and paste it from wherever you know that this is the
correct fingerprint.
An example for an entry in the trustlist.txt is:
......@@ -199,12 +199,12 @@ dirmngr
libgcrypt
libksba
libassuan [statically linked]
libldap [system libary]
liblber [system libary]
libsasl [system libary, required by libldap]
libdb2 [system libary, required by libsasl]
libcrypt [system libary, required by libsasl - OOPS]
libpam [system libary, required by libsasl]
libldap [system library]
liblber [system library]
libsasl [system library, required by libldap]
libdb2 [system library, required by libsasl]
libcrypt [system library, required by libsasl - OOPS]
libpam [system library, required by libsasl]
[Standard system libraries]
pinentry-curses
......
......@@ -8,9 +8,9 @@ strings can accept multiple values that mean essentially the same
thing.
For example, the string "yes" in English is "sí" in Spanish. However,
some users will type "si" (without the accent). To accomodate both
some users will type "si" (without the accent). To accommodate both
users, you can translate the string "yes" as "sí|si". You can have
any number of alternate matches seperated by the | character like
any number of alternate matches separated by the | character like
"sí|si|seguro".
The strings that can be handled in this way are of the form "yes|yes",
......
......@@ -496,7 +496,7 @@ This directory may contain extra certificates which are preloaded
into the interal cache on startup. Applications using dirmngr (e.g. gpgsm)
can request cached certificates to complete a trust chain.
This is convenient in cases you have a couple intermediate CA certificates
or certificates ususally used to sign OCSP responses.
or certificates usually used to sign OCSP responses.
These certificates are first tried before going
out to the net to look for them. These certificates must also be
@acronym{DER} encoded and suffixed with @file{.crt} or @file{.der}.
......@@ -784,7 +784,7 @@ revoked or one of the usual error codes from libgpg-error.
@end example
Check whether the certificate with @var{fingerprint} (the SHA-1 hash of
the entire X.509 certificate blob) is valid by consulting the appropiate
the entire X.509 certificate blob) is valid by consulting the appropriate
OCSP responder. If the fingerprint has not been given or the
certificate is not known by Dirmngr, the function inquires the
certificate using:
......@@ -816,7 +816,7 @@ revoked or one of the usual error codes from libgpg-error.
Put a certificate into the internal cache. This command might be
useful if a client knows in advance certificates required for a test and
wnats to make sure they get added to the internal cache. It is also
wants to make sure they get added to the internal cache. It is also
helpful for debugging. To get the actual certificate, this command
immediately inquires it using
......@@ -831,7 +831,7 @@ as a binary blob.
@noindent
The return code is 0 for success; i.e. the certificate has not been
succesfully cached or one of the usual error codes from libgpg-error.
successfully cached or one of the usual error codes from libgpg-error.
@node Dirmngr VALIDATE
@subsection Validate a certificate for debugging
......@@ -883,7 +883,7 @@ as a binary blob.
@c @var{fingerprint} is optional and expected to be the SHA-1 has of the
@c DER encoding of the certificate under question. It is to be HEX
@c encoded. The rationale for sending the fingerprint is that it allows
@c dirmngr to reply immediatly if it has already cached such a request. If
@c dirmngr to reply immediately if it has already cached such a request. If
@c this is not the case and no certificate has been found in dirmngr's
@c internal certificate storage, dirmngr will request the certificate using
@c the Assuan inquiry
......@@ -905,7 +905,7 @@ as a binary blob.
@c available for the certificate and the certificate itself is not listed
@c in this CRL, @code{GPG_ERR_CERT_REVOKED} to indicate that the certificate is
@c listed in the CRL or @code{GPG_ERR_NO_CRL_KNOWN} in cases where no CRL or no
@c information is available. The first two codes are immediatly returned to
@c information is available. The first two codes are immediately returned to
@c the caller and the processing of this request has been done.
@c
@c Only the @code{GPG_ERR_NO_CRL_KNOWN} needs more attention: Dirmngr now
......@@ -941,7 +941,7 @@ as a binary blob.
@c * Try to load a CRL from all configured servers (ldapservers.conf)
@c in turn. The first server returning a CRL is used.
@c * @code(crl_cache_insert) is then used to actually insert the CRL
@c into the cache. If this failed we give up immediatley without
@c into the cache. If this failed we give up immediately without
@c checking the rest of the servers from the first step.
@c * Ready.
@c
......@@ -1013,7 +1013,7 @@ as a binary blob.
@c sure that @code{validate_cert_chain} does not try to lookup the CRL we
@c are currently processing. This would be a catch-22 and may indicate a
@c broken PKI. However, due to overlapping expiring times and imprecise
@c clocks thsi may actually happen.
@c clocks this may actually happen.
@c
@c For historical reasons the Assuan command ISVALID is a bit different
@c to CHECKCRL but this is mainly due to different calling conventions.
......@@ -1072,8 +1072,8 @@ as a binary blob.
@c If the issuer's certificate has been found, the signature of the
@c actual certificate is checked and in case this fails the error
@c #code{GPG_ERR_BAD_CERT_CHAIN} is returned. If the signature checks out, the
@c maximum cahin length of the issueing certificate is checked as well as
@c the capiblity of the certificate (i.e. whether he may be used for
@c maximum chain length of the issuing certificate is checked as well as
@c the capability of the certificate (i.e. whether he may be used for
@c certificate signing). Then the certificate is prepended to our list
@c representing the certificate chain. Finally the loop is continued now
@c with the issuer's certificate as the current certificate.
......
......@@ -73,7 +73,7 @@ update this FAQ in the next month. See the section "Changes" for recent updates
item to note is that starting with GnuPG version 1.1.92 the file
containing user options and settings has been renamed from "options"
to "gpg.conf". Information in the FAQ that relates to the options
file may be interchangable with the newer gpg.conf file in many
file may be interchangeable with the newer gpg.conf file in many
instances. See question
[[#gnupg-no-longer-installs-a-options-file-is-it-missing][GnuPG no longer installs a ~/.gnupg/options file. Is it missing?]]
for details.
......@@ -491,7 +491,7 @@ update this FAQ in the next month. See the section "Changes" for recent updates
On a secure machine:
1. If you want to do automatic signing, create a signing subkey for
your key. Use the interactive key editing menu by issueing the
your key. Use the interactive key editing menu by issuing the
command
: gpg --edit-key keyID
enter "addkey" and select the DSA key type).
......@@ -651,7 +651,7 @@ update this FAQ in the next month. See the section "Changes" for recent updates
:CUSTOM_ID: how-do-i-verify-signed-packages
:END:
must first have the vendor, organisation, or issueing person's key
must first have the vendor, organisation, or issuing person's key
Before you can verify the signature that accompanies a package, you
imported into your public keyring. To prevent GnuPG warning
messages the key should also be validated (or locally signed).
......@@ -1278,7 +1278,7 @@ update this FAQ in the next month. See the section "Changes" for recent updates
and where it is easy to exchange the passphrases (e.g. with your boy
friend or your wife). The advantage is that you can change the
passphrase from time to time and decrease the risk, that many old
messages may be decrypted by people who accidently got your passphrase.
messages may be decrypted by people who accidentally got your passphrase.
You can add and copy keys to and from your keyring with the 'gpg
--import' and 'gpg --export' command. 'gpg --export-secret-keys' will
......
......@@ -76,7 +76,7 @@ the included Secure Shell Agent you may start the agent using:
@c interface that the owner has access to, but the supplicant does not).
@c
@c The rationale for this separation is that it allows access to the
@c secret key to be tightly controled and audited, and it doesn't permit
@c secret key to be tightly controlled and audited, and it doesn't permit
@c the the supplicant to either copy the key or to override the owner's
@c intentions.
......
......@@ -2265,7 +2265,7 @@ The available filter types are:
@item drop-sig
This filter drops the selected key signatures on user ids.
Self-signatures are not consideres.
Self-signatures are not considered.
Currently only implemented for --import-filter.
@end table
......@@ -2423,7 +2423,7 @@ this is implicitly enable for secret keys.
@item --with-wkd-hash
@opindex with-wkd-hash
Print a Web Key Directory indentifier along with each user ID in key
Print a Web Key Directory identifier along with each user ID in key
listings. This is an experimental feature and semantics may change.
@item --with-secret
......
......@@ -852,7 +852,7 @@ updated; new distributions of this software should come with an updated
list but it is still the responsibility of the Administrator to check
that this list is correct.
Everytime @command{gpgsm} uses a certificate for signing or verification
Every time @command{gpgsm} uses a certificate for signing or verification
this file will be consulted to check whether the certificate under
question has ultimately been issued by one of these CAs. If this is the
case the user will be informed that the verified signature represents a
......@@ -1110,7 +1110,7 @@ certificate signing request):
@item Serial: @var{sn}
If this parameter is given an X.509 certificate will be generated.
@var{sn} is expected to be a hex string representing an unsigned
integer of arbitary length. The special value @samp{random} can be
integer of arbitrary length. The special value @samp{random} can be
used to create a 64 bit random serial number.
@item Issuer-DN: @var{issuer-name}
......
......@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ get that whole thing up and running.
** Building the software
Building the software is decribed in the file @file{INSTALL}. Given
Building the software is described in the file @file{INSTALL}. Given
that you are already reading this documentation we can only give some
extra hints
......@@ -62,7 +62,7 @@ user installation this can be done once for all users on a machine.
Specific changes on a per-user base are also possible.
@end itemize
@c decribe how to maintain trustlist.txt and /etc/gnupg/trustlist.txt.
@c describe how to maintain trustlist.txt and /etc/gnupg/trustlist.txt.
@c ** How to get the ssh support running
......
......@@ -1436,7 +1436,7 @@ unarmor_pump (UnarmorPump x, int c)
case STA_wait_dash:
x->state = c == '-'? STA_first_dash : STA_wait_newline;
break;
case STA_first_dash: /* just need for initalization */
case STA_first_dash: /* just need for initialization */
x->pos = 0;
x->state = STA_compare_header;
case STA_compare_header:
......
......@@ -2704,7 +2704,7 @@ main (int argc, char **argv)
break;
case oRFC4880bis:
opt.flags.rfc4880bis = 1;
/* fall thru. */
/* fall through. */
case oOpenPGP:
case oRFC4880:
/* This is effectively the same as RFC2440, but with
......
......@@ -2767,7 +2767,7 @@ keyedit_menu (ctrl_t ctrl, const char *username, strlist_t locusr,
goto leave;
break;
}
/* fall thru */
/* fall through */
case cmdSAVE:
if (modified)
{
......
......@@ -2247,7 +2247,7 @@ proc_tree (CTX c, kbnode_t node)
/* We must skip our special plaintext marker packets here because
they may be the root packet. These packets are only used in
addional checks and skipping them here doesn't matter. */
addtional checks and skipping them here doesn't matter. */
while (node
&& node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_GPG_CONTROL
&& node->pkt->pkt.gpg_control->control == CTRLPKT_PLAINTEXT_MARK)
......
......@@ -428,7 +428,7 @@ do_we_trust( PKT_public_key *pk, unsigned int trustlevel )
default:
log_error ("invalid trustlevel %u returned from validation layer\n",
trustlevel);
/* fall thru */
/* fall through */
case TRUST_UNKNOWN:
case TRUST_UNDEFINED:
log_info(_("%s: There is no assurance this key belongs"
......@@ -655,7 +655,7 @@ check_signatures_trust (ctrl_t ctrl, PKT_signature *sig)
default:
log_error ("invalid trustlevel %u returned from validation layer\n",
trustlevel);
/* fall thru */
/* fall through */
case TRUST_UNKNOWN:
case TRUST_UNDEFINED:
write_trust_status (STATUS_TRUST_UNDEFINED, trustlevel);
......
......@@ -2848,7 +2848,7 @@ email_from_user_id (const char *user_id)
TOFU_POLICY_ASK.
This function returns 0 on success and an error code if an error
occured. */
occurred. */
gpg_error_t
tofu_register_signature (ctrl_t ctrl,
PKT_public_key *pk, strlist_t user_id_list,
......
......@@ -161,7 +161,7 @@ static const char hlp_finddevice[] =
"FINDDEVICE <name>\n"
"\n"
"Find the device matching NAME. NAME be any identifier from\n"
"g13tab permissable for the user. The corresponding block\n"
"g13tab permissible for the user. The corresponding block\n"
"device is retruned using a status line.";
static gpg_error_t
cmd_finddevice (assuan_context_t ctx, char *line)
......
......@@ -55,7 +55,7 @@
/* The length in blocks of the space we put at the start and at the
end of the device. This space is used to store N copies of the
setup area for the actual encrypted container inbetween. */
setup area for the actual encrypted container in between. */
#define HEADER_SECTORS (SETUP_AREA_SECTORS * HEADER_SETUP_AREA_COPIES)
#define FOOTER_SECTORS (SETUP_AREA_SECTORS * FOOTER_SETUP_AREA_COPIES)
......
/* keybox-init.c - Initalization of the library
/* keybox-init.c - Initialization of the library
* Copyright (C) 2001 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
*
* This file is part of GnuPG.
......
......@@ -53,7 +53,7 @@ fi[]dnl
# to PKG_CHECK_MODULES(), but does not set variables or print errors.
#
# Please remember that m4 expands AC_REQUIRE([PKG_PROG_PKG_CONFIG])
# only at the first occurence in configure.ac, so if the first place
# only at the first occurrence in configure.ac, so if the first place
# it's called might be skipped (such as if it is within an "if", you
# have to call PKG_CHECK_EXISTS manually
# --------------------------------------------------------------
......
......@@ -220,7 +220,7 @@ prepare_dirmngr (ctrl_t ctrl, assuan_context_t ctx, gpg_error_t err)
line[DIM (line) - 1] = 0;
assuan_transact (ctx, line, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL);
/* The code below is not required becuase we don't return an error. */
/* The code below is not required because we don't return an error. */
/* err = [above call] */
/* if (gpg_err_code (err) == GPG_ERR_ASS_UNKNOWN_CMD) */
/* err = 0; /\* Allow the use of old dirmngr versions. *\/ */
......
......@@ -1279,9 +1279,9 @@ main ( int argc, char **argv)
case oStatusFD: ctrl.status_fd = pargs.r.ret_int; break;
case oLoggerFD: log_set_fd (pargs.r.ret_int ); break;
case oWithMD5Fingerprint:
opt.with_md5_fingerprint=1; /*fall thru*/
opt.with_md5_fingerprint=1; /*fall through*/
case oWithFingerprint:
with_fpr=1; /*fall thru*/
with_fpr=1; /*fall through*/
case aFingerprint:
opt.fingerprint++;
break;
......@@ -1360,7 +1360,7 @@ main ( int argc, char **argv)
opt.def_recipient_self = 0;
break;
case oWithKeyData: opt.with_key_data=1; /* fall thru */
case oWithKeyData: opt.with_key_data=1; /* fall through */
case oWithColons: ctrl.with_colons = 1; break;
case oWithSecret: ctrl.with_secret = 1; break;
case oWithValidation: ctrl.with_validation=1; break;
......
......@@ -49,7 +49,7 @@ EXTRA_DIST = runtest inittests $(testscripts) ChangeLog-2011 \
samplekeys/cert_g10code_theo1.pem
# We used to run $(testscripts) here but these asschk scripts are not
# completely reliable in all enviroments and thus we better disable
# completely reliable in all environments and thus we better disable
# them. The tests are anyway way too minimal. We will eventually
# write new tests based on gpg-connect-agent which has a full fledged
# script language and thus makes it far easier to write tests than to
......
......@@ -86,7 +86,7 @@ Please read accompanying file COPYING.
Directives
(gc)
Performs garbage collection immediatelly.
Performs garbage collection immediately.
(gc-verbose) (gc-verbose <bool>)
The argument (defaulting to #t) controls whether GC produces
......
......@@ -2777,7 +2777,7 @@ static pointer opexe_0(scheme *sc, enum scheme_opcodes op) {
#if 1
case OP_LAMBDA: /* lambda */
/* If the hook is defined, apply it to sc->code, otherwise
set sc->value fall thru */
set sc->value fall through */
{
pointer f=find_slot_in_env(sc,sc->envir,sc->COMPILE_HOOK,1);
if(f==sc->NIL) {
......
......@@ -63,5 +63,5 @@ N1Glbw1OJfP1q+QFPMPKoCsTYmZpuugq2b5gV/eH0Abvk2pG4Fo/YTDPHhec7Jk=
(pipe:do
(pipe:echo (eval armored-file (current-environment)))
(pipe:spawn `(,@GPGV --keyring ,(in-srcdir "forged-keyring.gpg"))))
(error "verification succeded but should not")))
(error "verification succeeded but should not")))
'(msg_signed_asc))
......@@ -11,8 +11,8 @@
# Check that gpg verifies only signatures where there is no ambiguity
# in the order of packets. Needs the Demo Keys Lima and Mike.
# Note: We do son't support multiple signaturess anymore thus thsi test is
# not really needed becuase verify could do the same. We keep it anyway.
# Note: We do son't support multiple signaturess anymore thus this test is
# not really needed because verify could do the same. We keep it anyway.
. $srcdir/defs.inc || exit 3
......
......@@ -321,7 +321,7 @@ GisM
(pipe:defer (lambda (sink)
(display armored-file (fdopen sink "w"))))
(pipe:spawn `(,@GPG --verify)))
(error "verification succeded but should not")))
(error "verification succeeded but should not")))
'(msg_olsols_asc_multiple msg_clsclss_asc_multiple))
(for-each-p
......@@ -331,7 +331,7 @@ GisM
(pipe:do
(pipe:echo (eval armored-file (current-environment)))
(pipe:spawn `(,@GPG --verify)))
(error "verification succeded but should not")))
(error "verification succeeded but should not")))
'(bad_ls_asc bad_fols_asc bad_olsf_asc bad_ools_asc))
......
......@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ These are tests based on NIST's Public Key Interoperability Test Suite
http://csrc.nist.gov/pki/testing/x509paths.html .
README - this file.
PKITS_data.tar.bz2 - the orginal ZIP file, repackaged as a tarball.
PKITS_data.tar.bz2 - the original ZIP file, repackaged as a tarball.
Makefile.am - Part of our build system.
import-all-certs - Run a simple import test on all certifcates
validate-all-certs - Run an import and validate test on all certificates
......
......@@ -63,7 +63,7 @@ ${cat_passwd} \
| while IFS=: read -r user dmy_a uid dmy_c dmy_d home shell dmy_rest; do
# Process only entries with a valid login shell
grep </etc/shells "^$shell" 2>/dev/null >/dev/null || continue
# and with an existant gnupg home directory
# and with an pre-existing gnupg home directory
[ -d "$home/.gnupg" ] || continue
# but not root
[ "${uid:-0}" -eq 0 ] && continue
......
......@@ -413,7 +413,7 @@ get_var (const char *name)
}
/* Perform some simple arithmentic operations. Caller must release
/* Perform some simple arithmetic operations. Caller must release
the return value. On error the return value is NULL. */
static char *
arithmetic_op (int operator, const char *operands)
......
......@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@
#include "mime-maker.h"
/* All valid charachters in a header name. */
/* All valid characters in a header name. */
#define HEADER_NAME_CHARS ("abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz" \
"ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ" \
"-01234567890")
......@@ -203,7 +203,7 @@ find_parent (part_t root, part_t needle)
/* Create a boundary string. Outr codes is aware of the general
* structure of that string (gebins with "=-=") so that
* it can protect against accidently used boundaries within the
* it can protect against accidentally-used boundaries within the
* content. */
static char *
generate_boundary (mime_maker_t ctx)
......@@ -369,7 +369,7 @@ mime_maker_add_header (mime_maker_t ctx, const char *name, const char *value)
gpg_error_t err;
part_t part, parent;
/* Hack to use this fucntion for a synacx check of NAME and VALUE. */
/* Hack to use this function for a syntax check of NAME and VALUE. */
if (!ctx)
return add_header (NULL, name, value);
......
......@@ -123,7 +123,7 @@ show_message_parser_event (rfc822parse_event_t event)
/* Do in-place decoding of quoted-printable data of LENGTH in BUFFER.
Returns the new length of the buffer and stores true at R_SLBRK if
the line ended with a soft line break; false is stored if not.
This fucntion asssumes that a complete line is passed in
This function asssumes that a complete line is passed in
buffer. */
static size_t
qp_decode (char *buffer, size_t length, int *r_slbrk)
......
Markdown is supported
0% or
You are about to add 0 people to the discussion. Proceed with caution.
Finish editing this message first!
Please register or to comment