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Commit 0905f825 authored by Laurent Léonard's avatar Laurent Léonard
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Fix QEMU driver custom domain status XML extensions. 

Thanks: Daniel P. Berrange
parent f6e41aea
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debian/patches/0009-Fix-QEMU-driver-custom-domain-status-XML-extensions.patch 0 → 100644
+ 183
− 0
View file @ 0905f825
From 8baa88ec8d89140126aaa168287a17b5cf918fb3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Daniel P. Berrange <berrange@redhat.com>
Date: Mon, 18 Jan 2010 16:24:25 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] Fix QEMU driver custom domain status XML extensions
Invoking the virConnectGetCapabilities() method causes the QEMU
driver to rebuild its internal capabilities object. Unfortunately
it was forgetting to register the custom domain status XML hooks
again.
To avoid this kind of error in the future, the code which builds
capabilities is refactored into one single method, which can be
called from all locations, ensuring reliable rebuilds.
* src/qemu/qemu_driver.c: Fix rebuilding of capabilities XML and
guarentee it is always consistent
---
src/qemu/qemu_driver.c | 110 +++++++++++++++++++++++-------------------------
1 files changed, 53 insertions(+), 57 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/qemu/qemu_driver.c b/src/qemu/qemu_driver.c
index 2d80774..9a3ddfb 100644
--- a/src/qemu/qemu_driver.c
+++ b/src/qemu/qemu_driver.c
@@ -892,34 +892,6 @@ qemuReconnectDomains(struct qemud_driver *driver)
static int
-qemudSecurityCapsInit(virSecurityDriverPtr secdrv,
- virCapsPtr caps)
-{
- const char *doi, *model;
-
- doi = virSecurityDriverGetDOI(secdrv);
- model = virSecurityDriverGetModel(secdrv);
-
- caps->host.secModel.model = strdup(model);
- if (!caps->host.secModel.model) {
- virReportOOMError(NULL);
- return -1;
- }
-
- caps->host.secModel.doi = strdup(doi);
- if (!caps->host.secModel.doi) {
- virReportOOMError(NULL);
- return -1;
- }
-
- VIR_DEBUG("Initialized caps for security driver \"%s\" with "
- "DOI \"%s\"", model, doi);
-
- return 0;
-}
-
-
-static int
qemudSecurityInit(struct qemud_driver *qemud_drv)
{
int ret;
@@ -940,15 +912,52 @@ qemudSecurityInit(struct qemud_driver *qemud_drv)
qemud_drv->securityDriver = security_drv;
VIR_INFO("Initialized security driver %s", security_drv->name);
-
- /*
- * Add security policy host caps now that the security driver is
- * initialized.
- */
- return qemudSecurityCapsInit(security_drv, qemud_drv->caps);
+ return 0;
}
+static virCapsPtr
+qemuCreateCapabilities(virCapsPtr oldcaps,
+ virSecurityDriverPtr secDriver)
+{
+ virCapsPtr caps;
+
+ /* Basic host arch / guest machine capabilities */
+ if (!(caps = qemudCapsInit(oldcaps))) {
+ virReportOOMError(NULL);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ /* Domain XML parser hooks */
+ caps->privateDataAllocFunc = qemuDomainObjPrivateAlloc;
+ caps->privateDataFreeFunc = qemuDomainObjPrivateFree;
+ caps->privateDataXMLFormat = qemuDomainObjPrivateXMLFormat;
+ caps->privateDataXMLParse = qemuDomainObjPrivateXMLParse;
+
+
+ /* Security driver data */
+ if (secDriver) {
+ const char *doi, *model;
+
+ doi = virSecurityDriverGetDOI(secDriver);
+ model = virSecurityDriverGetModel(secDriver);
+
+ if (!(caps->host.secModel.model = strdup(model)))
+ goto no_memory;
+ if (!(caps->host.secModel.doi = strdup(doi)))
+ goto no_memory;
+
+ VIR_DEBUG("Initialized caps for security driver \"%s\" with "
+ "DOI \"%s\"", model, doi);
+ }
+
+ return caps;
+
+no_memory:
+ virReportOOMError(NULL);
+ virCapabilitiesFree(caps);
+ return NULL;
+}
/**
* qemudStartup:
@@ -1074,13 +1083,12 @@ qemudStartup(int privileged) {
virStrerror(-rc, buf, sizeof(buf)));
}
- if ((qemu_driver->caps = qemudCapsInit(NULL)) == NULL)
- goto out_of_memory;
+ if (qemudSecurityInit(qemu_driver) < 0)
+ goto error;
- qemu_driver->caps->privateDataAllocFunc = qemuDomainObjPrivateAlloc;
- qemu_driver->caps->privateDataFreeFunc = qemuDomainObjPrivateFree;
- qemu_driver->caps->privateDataXMLFormat = qemuDomainObjPrivateXMLFormat;
- qemu_driver->caps->privateDataXMLParse = qemuDomainObjPrivateXMLParse;
+ if ((qemu_driver->caps = qemuCreateCapabilities(NULL,
+ qemu_driver->securityDriver)) == NULL)
+ goto error;
if ((qemu_driver->activePciHostdevs = pciDeviceListNew(NULL)) == NULL)
goto error;
@@ -1104,10 +1112,6 @@ qemudStartup(int privileged) {
}
}
- if (qemudSecurityInit(qemu_driver) < 0) {
- goto error;
- }
-
/* If hugetlbfs is present, then we need to create a sub-directory within
* it, since we can't assume the root mount point has permissions that
* will let our spawned QEMU instances use it.
@@ -3255,15 +3259,12 @@ static char *qemudGetCapabilities(virConnectPtr conn) {
char *xml = NULL;
qemuDriverLock(driver);
- if ((caps = qemudCapsInit(qemu_driver->caps)) == NULL)
- goto no_memory;
- caps->privateDataAllocFunc = qemuDomainObjPrivateAlloc;
- caps->privateDataFreeFunc = qemuDomainObjPrivateFree;
-
- if (qemu_driver->securityDriver &&
- qemudSecurityCapsInit(qemu_driver->securityDriver, caps) < 0)
- goto no_memory;
+ if ((caps = qemuCreateCapabilities(qemu_driver->caps,
+ qemu_driver->securityDriver)) == NULL) {
+ virCapabilitiesFree(caps);
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
virCapabilitiesFree(qemu_driver->caps);
qemu_driver->caps = caps;
@@ -3275,11 +3276,6 @@ cleanup:
qemuDriverUnlock(driver);
return xml;
-
-no_memory:
- virCapabilitiesFree(caps);
- virReportOOMError(conn);
- goto cleanup;
}
--
1.6.5.2
debian/patches/series
+ 1
− 0
View file @ 0905f825
......@@ -6,3 +6,4 @@
0006-Terminate-nc-on-EOF.patch
0007-Implement-path-lookup-for-USB-by-vendor-product.patch
0008-qemu-Use-log-output-for-pty-assignment-if-info-chard.patch
0009-Fix-QEMU-driver-custom-domain-status-XML-extensions.patch
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